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Queensland requirements (old and new) for the appointment of a real 
estate agent 
 
 
In Moneywood Pty Ltd v Salamon Nominees Pty Ltd 1 the High Court of 
Australia considered an appeal from the Queensland Court of Appeal in 
relation to the correct interpretation of s76 (1)(c) Auctioneers and Agents Act 
1971 (Qld).  In paraphrase, s76(1)(c) provides that a real estate agent shall 
not be entitled to sue for or recover any commission unless “the engagement 
or appointment to act as …..real estate agent ….. in respect of such 
transaction is in writing signed by the person to be charged with 
such…..commission…..or the person’s agent or representative” (“the statutory 
requirement”). 
 
Facts 
 
The appellant was engaged as a real estate agent by the respondent to find a 
purchaser.  A potential purchaser was found and the respondent agreed to 
sell to the potential purchaser.  A conditional contract was entered into (“the 
first contract”) that identified the appellant as the vendor’s agent.  The first 
contract was never completed and no commission was payable in relation to 
it. 
 
To accommodate a perceived need for a “koala corridor”, the local authority 
purchased part of the land that was subject to the first contract.  The balance 
of the land was then sold to the original purchaser under a further contract 
(“the second contract”).  The first contract was not rescinded until the second 
contract was executed.  The second contract failed to identify the appellant as 
the vendor’s agent.  Following settlement of the second contract, the real 
estate agent claimed an entitlement to commission but the vendor denied this 
entitlement.  Liability was denied on the basis that the agent was not the 
effective cause of sale and further on the basis that the statutory requirement 
had not been met. 
 
In claiming an entitlement to commission the agent relied on the appointment 
in the first contract, as evidenced by clause 30 of the standard REIQ contract. 
 
District Court 
 
In the District Court 2 it was held that the real estate agent was entitled to 
commission. 
 
Court of Appeal 
 
The Court of Appeal 3 upheld the vendor’s appeal.  Whilst holding that the real 
estate agent was the effective cause of the sale, the Court of Appeal by 
majority (McPherson JA dissenting) considered that the statutory requirement 
had not been satisfied.  To meet the statutory requirement the majority 
considered that the written appointment needed to be “transaction specific”, 
that is specific to the second contract.  As a matter of construction the majority 
found that the appointment in clause 30 of the first contract was limited to that 
transaction and the agent was not therefore entitled to commission on the 
second contract. 
 
In his dissenting judgment, McPherson JA considered that clause 30 of the 
first contract satisfied the statutory requirement.  McPherson JA considered 
that the statutory word “transaction” was sufficiently broad for the second 
contract fairly to be considered as part of the same “transaction” in respect of 
which the relationship of principal and agent was originally constituted by the 
oral agency agreement 4. 
 
High Court 
 
On appeal to the High Court, the appellant urged the High Court to adopt the 
analysis of the Auctioneers and Agents Act 1971 (Qld) favoured by 
McPherson JA.  The High Court unanimously allowed the appeal5.  The 
individual members of the High Court agreed with the conclusion of the both 
the District Court judge and all the members of the Court of Appeal that the 
real estate agent was the effective cause of the completed second contract 
notwithstanding the differences in the contracts.  The High Court though, 
unlike the Court of Appeal, did not consider that the statutory requirement was 
“transaction specific”. 
 
Gleeson CJ opined that there was a sufficient connection between the agency 
and the second contract to treat the appointment (as evidenced by clause 30 
of the first contract) as being in respect of the transaction and to conclude that 
the statutory requirement was satisfied.  In reaching this conclusion Gleeson 
CJ held that there was no legislative purpose served by requiring a fresh 
appointment where the original appointment (in the first contract) was wide 
enough to comprehend the second contract provided the original appointment 
had a sufficient connection with the second contract to justify a conclusion 
that the appointment was in respect of the second contract. 
 
McHugh J stated that s76 (1) (c) of the Auctioneers and Agents Act 1971 
(Qld) did not require writing that constituted the appointment as agent for the 
specific transaction.  In His Honour’s opinion clause 30 of the first contract 
was more than evidence of a transaction concerning an agency to sell the 
whole of the land.  Clause 30 contained an implied term that the agent was 
entitled to commission if there was a sale of any part of the land provided the 
agent’s work remained, as it was held to be, an effective cause of that sale. 
 
Gummow J adopted a similar approach to McHugh J holding that an 
undertaking by a principal to pay a commission to an agent in respect of a 
sale of a certain interest in land also contains an undertaking to pay a rateable 
part of that commission if the introduced buyer purchases only part of that 
land, at least in the absence of any contrary indication.  Gummow J rejected 
the submission that the standard condition 30 was in some sense “transaction 
specific”. 
 
As to whether the statutory requirement had been complied with, Gummow J 
considered that both the first and the second contracts were “in respect of” the 
transaction.  No commission was payable on the first contract as no land was 
sold under it whereas commission was payable under the second contract.  
The writing in the first contract satisfied the statutory requirement in respect of 
the claim to commission for the sale under the second contract. 
 
Kirby J, whilst noting that the statutory requirements were intended to protect 
consumers, observed that the legislation must be capable of operating in 
circumstances in which, not infrequently, the original transaction contemplated 
by the parties, introduced by an agent, needs to be varied.  In Kirby J’s view 
textual considerations also justified the conclusion reached by McPherson JA 
in the Court of Appeal.  For these reasons, amongst others, Kirby J 
considered that clause 30 of the first contract could be treated as being in “in 
respect of” the “transaction” that was ultimately completed.  If this were not so, 
in Kirby J’s view, an agent could never rely upon a general appointment and 
would always be obliged to secure a fresh appointment each time a distinct 
contract was brought about. 
 
Callinan J took an approach largely similar to Kirby J.  In Justice Callinan’s 
view the statutory requirement did not require documentary evidence having 
specific reference to the very transaction out of which the claim for 
commission arose.  To afford such a narrow operation to the section would be 
tantamount to requiring an agent to obtain a fresh appointment every time a 
different contract or a new term was agreed. 
 
Practice Pointer 
 
Although the decision of the High Court may be seen to afford some 
protection to a real estate agent faced with a minor variation of a contract or a 
new contract clearly arising out of a transaction for which a written 
appointment is held, the decision must be viewed in its relevant factual 
context. 
 
As noted the conclusion reached by the High Court was only sustainable on 
the factual basis that the agent remained the effective cause of the sale.  
Further, the agent required an appointment in writing that factually had a 
sufficient connection to the ultimate sale. 
 
Finally, it is important to bear in mind that at the time of writing this article 
legislative change is imminent in Queensland.  On 1 July 2001, those 
provisions of the Property Agents and Motor Dealers Act 2000 (Qld) (“the new 
legislation”) that are not in force will commence6, repealing the Auctioneers 
and Agents Act 1971 (Qld). 
 
The provisions of the new legislation concerning the appointment of real 
estate agents are quite specific7.  In particular the appointment of a real estate 
agent must be in writing in the prescribed form (which includes a prominent 
statement that the client should seek independent legal advice before signing 
the appointment)8.  A real estate agent is not to act without first obtaining this 
written appointment (a copy of which is to be given to the client)9. 
 
Further if the appointment of a real estate agent is to be for a sole or exclusive 
agency, before the appointment in the prescribed form is signed, the real 
estate agent must give the client a notice in the prescribed form stating, 
amongst other things, that for the sale of residential property the term is 
negotiable up to a maximum term of 60 days and the difference between sole 
agency and exclusive agency10. 
 
If an agent is not properly appointed in the manner described, the agent will 
not be entitled to sue for, or recover or retain any commission or expense for 
performing activities as a real estate agent11. 
 
The introduction of a prescribed form of notice concerning the operation of a 
sole or exclusive agency and a prescribed form of written appointment of a 
real estate agency effectively means that the evidence of appointment 
(namely clause 30 of the REIQ contract) successfully relied on by the agent in 
Moneywood Pty Ltd v Salamon Nominees Pty Ltd 12 will no longer found a 
valid claim for commission.  It is imperative that the High Court’s decision is 
viewed in this context.  At some stage following the commencement of the 
new legislation, the standard REIQ contract is likely to be changed so that 
there will be no equivalent of clause 30 as considered by the High Court. 
 
By way of summary, the decision of the High Court must be carefully viewed 
in its particular factual context and mindful that a new statutory regime is 
imminent.  As demonstrated, real estate agents will need to exercise 
considerable care to ensure strict compliance with the new statutory regime.  
Failure to comply will have dramatic consequences including forfeiture of an 
entitlement to commission.  A prudent real estate agent would still insist on 
the execution of a fresh appointment in circumstances where the structure of 
the transaction is to be varied in other than a minor fashion or where there is a 
variation in the real property description of the land to be sold. 
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